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COMMENT
SmileCare v. Delta Dental: Aberration or Signpost for
the Future of Antitrust Enforcement in the
Supplemental Insurance Industry?
Elizabeth J. Fowler*
A recent article in a prominent dental journal chronicles
the case of a fifty-four year old woman in desperate need of
dental care.' Despite having basic insurance coverage for den-
tal care through her husband's part-time job, the woman could
not afford the steep copayment required by the dental insurer
in order to obtain services.2 As a direct result of forgoing neces-
sary dental care for a serious oral health condition, the woman
was eventually hospitalized.
The patient's dentist was willing to perform the treatment
and waive the cost-sharing amount, accepting the third-party
coverage as payment in full. He made repeated attempts to
persuade the dental insurer to allow him to provide the services
under such an arrangement, but the insurer refused. The den-
tal insurer suggested instead that the dentist simply provide
the care at no cost.3
Although cost sharing in the form of deductibles and co-
payments is common among health and dental insurers to limit
unnecessary utilization of services, it can impose substantial
barriers to access to care for patients with limited financial
* J.D. Candidate 1998, University of Minnesota Law School; BA_ 1989,
University of Pennsylvania; Ph.D. 1995, Johns Hopkins University.
1. See Gary T. Chiodo & Susan W. Tolle, Cost-Containment by Third
Party Payers: The Impact on Providing Care for Underinsured Patients, 41
GEN. DENTISTRY 113, 113 (1993).
2. See id. at 113-114. According to the article, the coverage required at
least a 50% copayment. See id. at 113. The total fee for the services that this
patient received was $2,510, and the required copayment was $1,355. See id.
at 114. Faced with such a steep copayment, the husband confessed that it
"might as well be one million dollars; we just don't have that kind of money."
1d.
3. See id.
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means. In fact, out-of-pocket costs often represent the deter-
mining factor in deciding among dental or medical treatment
options, irrespective of efficacy or quality.4 Medical care pro-
viders frequently waive copayment requirements for patients
who could not otherwise afford treatment. Most dental insurers
and a handful of states, however, expressly forbid this practice
among dentists.'
In response to the problem of underinsured dental patients
and the ban that many dental insurers place on waiver of co-
payments, the SmileCare Dental Group of Irvine, California,
developed an innovative insurance product known as
"supplemental dental care plans."6 These plans, offered to
employers, labor unions, and individuals, were modeled after
supplemental insurance products purchased by Medicare
beneficiaries and were designed to offset the out-of-pocket costs
not covered by a subscriber's primary dental insurance.7 The
supplemental insurance coverage relieves patients of copay-
ments for services, since the supplemental insurer pays this
portion of the bill directly to providers.8
Immediately following the introduction of this new dental
insurance product, Delta Dental Plan of California, the state's
predominant dental insurer, retaliated by instituting a new
policy prohibiting its participating providers from accepting
supplemental payments from SmileCare. 9  Delta Dental
deemed any provider who violated this policy in breach of con-
tract. As a penalty for breach, providers faced reduced fees,
threats of termination, or actual termination.10 With a sixty
percent market share for dental insurance and a participation
rate of ninety-five percent by California dentists, Delta Den-
tal's policy greatly affected SmileCare's business. SmileCare
responded by filing a claim against Delta Dental.
4. See Chiodo & Tolle, supra note 1, at 115.
5. See infra notes 29-31 and accompanying text (discussing opposition by
the American Dental Association and dental insurers to waiver of copayments
for dental services).
6. See SmileCare Dental Group v. Delta Dental Plan of Cal., 858 F.
Supp. 1035, 1036 (C.D. Cal. 1994), affd, 88 F.3d 780 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. de-
nied, 117 S. Ct. 583 (1996)
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See SmileCare Dental Group v. Delta Dental Plan of Cal., 88 F.3d 780,
781-82 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 583 (1996).
10. See id.
[Vol. 82:173
1997) SUMMARYDISMISSAL & ANTITRUST 175
In SmileCare Dental Group v. Delta Dental Plan of Cali-
fornia," SmileCare alleged that Delta Dental violated section 2
of the Sherman Act.12 According to SmileCare, Delta Dental
engaged in intentional predatory or anticompetitive conduct
and characterized Delta Dental's practice as a "group boycott."
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit disagreed and af-
firmed the lower court's dismissal of SmileCare's complaint for
failure to state a claim.
3
The SmileCare case is unique because it is the first to ex-
amine whether a primary insurer's policy of prohibiting pro-
viders from accepting supplemental payments in lieu of patient
copayments violates antitrust laws. The judicial affirmation of
Delta Dental's policy has significant implications for the dental
insurance industry and, potentially, for other markets like the
Medigap market for Medicare supplemental insurance.
This Comment maintains that the circuit court in Smile-
Care wrongly upheld the dismissal of SmileCare's complaint
against Delta Dental. Part I examines the market for dental
care services and recent antitrust enforcement activity in the
health care industry. Part II discusses the circuit court's rea-
soning and holding in the SmileCare case. Part III argues that
the court misconstrued the application of SmileCare's group-
boycott claim and erred in considering Delta Dental's "business
justification" for its policy prior to determining whether Delta
Dental engaged in anticompetitive and predatory conduct.
This Comment concludes that SmileCare represents an unwar-
ranted departure from accepted principles in antitrust juris-
prudence but does not signify a major shift in evaluating anti-
trust cases in the supplemental insurance industry or the
health care market as a whole.
I. USE OF DENTAL SERVICES AND ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT IN THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY
A. THE DEMAND FOR AND USE OF DENTAL SERVICES
The growth of dental insurance over the past twenty-five
years14 has caused a concurrent increase in the use of dental
11. The district court's opinion appears at 858 F. Supp. 1035 (C.D. CaL
1994). The circuit court's opinion appears at 88 F.3d 780 (9th Cir. 1996).
12. See 88 F.3d at 782.
13. See id. at 782.
14. In 1970, insurance payments accounted for only four percent of all
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services.1 5 Private dental plans currently cover an estimated
forty percent of the U.S. population.16 Studies show that those
with dental insurance, regardless of the level of coverage, use
dental services more often and seek preventive care more fre-
quently as compared to those who lack insurance.17  In fact,
those without dental insurance usually seek care only on an
emergency basis. 8
Although insurance may improve access to dental care, it
does not necessarily create the same "moral hazard," or over-
consumption, that prevails in other sectors of the health care
dental care payments. By 1980, the market for dental insurance increased to
31% of total payments, and as of 1994, insurance accounted for approximately
45% of all payments for dental care. See M.H. Anderson, Dental Insurance
Companies: Partners or Adversaries?, 19 COOPERATIVE DENTISTRY 41, 41
(1994).
15. See, e.g., H. Barry Waldman, Dental Insurance: Its Variations and Re-
lationship to the Use of Dental Services, J. AM. C. DENTISTS, Summer 1989, at
4, 6 (discussing the increase in aggregate and per-capita expenditures for den-
tal services between 1980 and 1987 and observing that, compared to those
without insurance, individuals with dental insurance have more visits per
person, a greater likelihood of a single dental visit and multiple dental visits
in the past year, and a greater likelihood of a check-up with the last dental
visit). But see Tryfon Beazoglou et al., Dental Care Utilization Over Time, 37
SOC. SCI. MED. 1461, 1461 (1993) (contending that per-capita real dental ex-
penditures experienced no net growth between 1978 and 1989 based on a
number of possible factors, including a reduction in dental disease due to in-
creased exposure to fluoridation, substitution of refined sugar by artificial
sweeteners, and improved oral health habits).
16. See Jay W. Friedman et al., Rethinking Dental Insurance, J. PUB.
HEALTH DENTISTRY, Summer 1995, at 131, 131 (noting that over 100 million
people in the U.S., approximately 40.5% of the total population aged two years
and older, carry some form of private dental insurance); Diana Reese, Smile
Insurance: Who Offers It, How to Get It, What's Covered, 9 AM. HEALTH 40, 40
(1990) (citing a survey conducted by the Health Insurance Association of
America finding that 80% of large corporations, with 10,000 or more employ-
ees, offer dental insurance, but that only 40% of companies overall offer such
insurance).
17. See Anderson, supra note 14, at 41. For example, 70% of those with
dental insurance will visit their dentist at least once a year, compared to 50%
of those without insurance. See id.; see also CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL
AND PREVENTION, U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, PUB. NO. 93-
1511, VITAL AND HEALTH STATISTICS-DENTAL SERVICES AND ORAL HEALTH:
UNITED STATES, 1989, at 9 (1992) (reporting results from the 1989 National
Health Interview Survey that people with dental insurance had an average of
2.8 dental visits per person per year compared to 1.7 visits for those without
dental insurance); H. Barry Waldman, Dental Insurance Coverage and the Use
of Dental Services by Children, J. DENTISTRY FOR CHILDREN, Mar.-Apr. 1989
at 125, 127 (reporting that children with private dental insurance were more
likely to have had a dental visit in the past year than children without insur-
ance).
18. See Anderson, supra note 14, at 41.
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industry.19 Because the price elasticity of demand" for dental
care is relatively small,21 additional insurance coverage will not
necessarily lead to an increase in the use of services.' This ob-
servation is particularly accurate for dental services other than
basic preventive services such as oral exams and prophylactic
19. Economists use the term "moral hazard" to explain why individuals
with insurance consume more services than they would if they paid the cost of
those services out-of-pocket. See PHILIP JACOBS, THE ECoNoMICs OF HEALTH
AND MEDICAL CARE 107-08 (3d ed. 1991). Insurers commonly use copayments
and deductibles to reduce the moral-hazard effect. See M. Susan Ridgely &
Howard H. Goldman, Putting the "Failure" of National Health Care Reform in
Perspective: Mental Health Benefits and the 'Benefit" of Incrementalism, 40
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 407, 416 n.39 (1996). Importantly, the moral-hazard phe-
nomenon occurs more frequently when the absolute value of the elasticity of
demand exceeds one. See JACOBS, supra at 108.
20. Economists employ the concept of "price elasticity of demand" to
measure consumer response in quantity demanded to a change in price. See
JACOBS, supra note 19, at 77-78. An elasticity measure with an absolute
value of less than 1.0 is relatively inelastic, or unresponsive to changes in
price. Thus, when the elasticity of demand is less than 1.0, a decrease in price
would lead to a decrease in total expenditures, because the relative increase
in the quantity purchased would not outweigh the price decrease. See id.
Conversely, when the elasticity measure exceeds 1.0 demand responsiveness
is elastic, and a decrease or increase in price would lead to a corresponding
increase or decrease in total expenditures because the change in consumer
demand would outweigh the change in price. See id. at 79.
To illustrate this concept, consider the price of basic goods like bread and
milk, presumably goods with inelastic prices. Out of necessity, all people requiring
these foods will probably pay whatever price is charged. Few will refuse to buy
the products because of price. If the prices falls, total expenditures will also
fall because people pay less for the goods and the lower price will lure few new
consumers into the market to increase the quantity demanded. Conversely,
the demand for most luxury goods is relatively price elastic. If, for example,
the price of airline tickets dropped, more people will take advantage of the
opportunity to purchase the fares cheaply and total expenditures will rise. As
the price increases, however, fewer people will buy fewer tickets and total ex-
penditures will drop.
21. See, e.g., Douglas Conrad et al, Dental Care Demand: Insurance Ef-
fects and Plan Design, 22 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 341, 356 (1987) (reporting
that the price elasticity of demand for dental care among an insured adult
population is relatively low, falling between 0.01 to 0.266); A.G. Holtmann &
E. Odgers Olsen, Jr., The Demand for Dental Care: A Study of Consumption
and Household Production, 11 J. HUM. RESOURCES 546, 559 (1976)
(confirming that elasticities with respect to price and waiting time for dental
care were small).
22. See David Grembowski & Douglas A. Conrad, Coinsurance Effects on
Dental Prices, 23 Soc. ScI. MED. 1131, 1137 (1986) (reporting that while den-
tal insurance reduces patients' sensitivity to price for dental care, coinsurance
rates have a minimal effect on the average annual payments for most dental
services).
177
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care.23 For example, nonprice factors may influence the de-
mand for restorative, periodontic, endodontic, and surgical
dental services such as root canals, dentures, and amalgams. 24
Moreover, like the demand for medical care, providers play an
influential role in determining demand for dental services, 5
which further reduces the importance of price in determining a
patient's choice of care.
Copayments provide one solution for preventing over-
consumption of services. For some individuals, however, cost-
sharing obligations may still pose a financial barrier to obtain-
ing necessary dental care despite insurance coverage. 26 Many
dental plans have maximum annual limits that are too low to
cover comprehensive treatment or deductibles and demand co-
payments which keep access to care out of the financial reach
of patients." Although full-coverage dental insurance does not
require out-of-pocket payments, such plan options are often
considerably more expensive than a dental plan with less than
100% coverage.
28
In response to financial concerns of patients, providers
sometimes elect to waive copayments for their patients and ac-
cept the insurance reimbursement as payment in full. Providers
may also waive copayments in order to attract business. Most
insurers, as well as the American Dental Association and Delta
Dental Plans Association,'-9 oppose the practice of waiving co-
23. See id.
24. See id. (reporting that variation in coinsurance rates has a minimal
effect on utilization, especially for services other than oral exams and prophy-
laxes, and that other non-price factors may have an equal or greater effect on
demand for services). Even for prophylactic treatments, a 100% reduction in
coinsurance rates increases the cost of such care by only eight cents. See id.
at 1135.
25. See id. at 1138 (noting that once a patient decides to visit a dentist,
the provider, rather than the patient, determines the demand for care).
26. See Chiodo & Tolle, supra note 1, at 114 (describing the barriers to
receiving necessary dental care that cost-sharing can impose even for people
with dental insurance).
27. See Friedman et at, supra note 16, at 131 (citing reasons for the limited
impact of dental insurance on the oral health of the U.S. population).
28. See SmileCare, 88 F.3d at 782 (noting that the cost of Delta Dental's
full coverage option is substantially higher than the cost of its primary plans
that include copayments).
29. Delta Dental Plans Association is a national organization that operates
nonprofit dental service plan corporations in virtually every state. See Gary 1L
Smith, Comment, Provider Control of Health Insurers: Are Doctors Still Calling the
Shots? 34 ST. LOUIS U. LJ. 1079, 1080 n.10 (1990). The Association traditionally
enjoys close ties to the dental profession. See Delta Dental Plans Association:
[Vol. 82:173
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payments because it increases the moral hazard of insurance.
30
Moreover, several states currently ban waiver of copayments,
and courts have upheld such restrictions on dentists as a valid
business practice in the insurance industry.31 As a result, a
Delta Dental Plans Special Relationship with the Profession, 87 J. AM.
DENTAL ASSN 1102, 1102 (1973) ("The awareness of the special relationship
existing between the [dental] profession and its own sponsored and endorsed
Delta Plans has been manifested in many ways .... ") (emphasis added). In
fact, the American Dental Association played a key role in providing financial
support to Delta Dental in its early days by purchasing stock in the plans' na-
tional underwriting company. See id. Similarly, Delta Dental provides sup-
port for the dental profession. See id. ("The Delta Dental Plans system
has... done an extraordinary job of projecting the influence and the view-
point of the [dental] profession....").
Hoffnan v. Delta Dental Plan of Minnesota, 517 F. Supp. 564, 570 (D.
Minn. 1981), explored the mutually beneficial relationship between Delta
Dental Plans and state dental associations. In Hoffman, which involved a
"group boycott" antitrust action against the dental service plan corporation,
the court observed that the state dental association created and controlled
Delta Dental by dominating its board of directors. See id. at 571. This inti-
mate relationship was sufficient to establish a conspiracy between Delta Den-
tal and the Minnesota Dental Association. See id.
30. Section 1-K of the American Dental Association (ADA) Principles of
Ethics and Code of Professional Conduct states in part: "A dentist who accepts
a third party payment under a copayment plan as payment in full, without
disclosing to the third party payer that the patient's payment portion will not
be collected,... is engaged in overbilling." See Gary T. Chiodo & Susan W.
Tolle, Dental Care Financing, GEN. DENTISTRY, Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 368, 368
(alterations in original); see also Huntley Paton, Dentists Love to Hate Former
Banker Olson, S.F. Bus. TIMES, May 25, 1987, at 14 (reporting that the Cali-
fornia Dental Association and Delta Dental Plan have implemented policies to
deny membership to dentists who waive patient costs). According to Delta
Dental, waiving copayments and accepting the insurance reimbursement as
payment in full increases the moral hazard by further insulating patients
from out-of-pocket costs. See SmileCare, 858 F. Supp. at 1038.
31. In 1991, at least 15 states prohibited dentists from waiving patient
copayments without disclosure to the insurance carrier or other third-party
payer. See Brenda Harrison & Joseph Nicosia, Waiving Copayment:A Look at
State Laws, 122 J. AM. DENTAL ASS'N 95, 95 (1991). Some states, such as Illi-
nois and Massachusetts, regard waiver of copayments as "irregularities" in
billing. See id. Other states, such as Texas, regard the practice of waiving
copayments as "unprofessional and dishonorable conduct" for a dentist. See
Mark J. Hanna, Waiver of Co-payments or Deductibles... Is It Legal?, TEX.
DENTAL J., Oct. 1994, at 49, 49. Apparently, organized dentistry and dental
insurers spearhead the opposition to waiver of copayments. See Chiodo &
Tolle, supra note 1, at 116.
Most states do not prohibit this practice, however. The Attorney General
of California, for example, issued an opinion on this matter: "[Wlhere a dental
insurance plan provides that the insurance company will pay a fixed percent-
age of a dentist's 'usual fee,' a dentist who claims a 'usual fee' that does not
account for the fact that he has waived a patient's copayment does not violate
California laws against misrepresentation and fraud." CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 1680 (West 1996) (citations omitted). But see Reynolds v. California
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vigorous debate has ensued within the dental profession over
whether or not waiver of copayments is ethical.
32
Patients for whom full coverage is prohibitively expensive
or unavailable may purchase supplemental insurance to pro-
vide coverage for deductibles and copayment amounts. The
market for supplemental health insurance is particularly
prominent among Medicare beneficiaries who purchase such
coverage to offset out-of-pocket costs not covered under Medi-
care.33 In fact, over twenty-two million elderly, or seventy-five
percent of all Medicare *beneficiaries, carry Medicare Supple-
mental Insurance, also known as Medigap, coverage. 34
Several factors distinguish the dental industry from the
rest of the medical industry. For example, dental insurance is
much less common among the U.S. population than health in-
surance.35 Practices that are accepted in the health industry,
such as waiver of copayments, are not prevalent in the dental
industry.36  In fact, according to one estimate, approximately
Dental Services, 200 Cal. App. 3d 590, 602 (Cal. App. 1988) (ruling that the
nonwaiver of copayment provision under CDS, a specialized health care serv-
ice plan, did not constitute an agreement to fix prices).
32. See Chiodo & Tolle, supra note 30, at 368-371 (presenting a discussion
regarding waiver of copayments). Some believe that states should allow den-
lists to waive copayments under certain circumstances but not for the purpose
of "undercutting" other dentists practicing in the same market. See id. at
370. Others contend that the ADA should reevaluate its position on waiver of
copayments and allow providers to use their own professional judgment re-
garding such waivers. See id. at 371; see also Chiodo & Tolle, supra note 1, at
114-16 (discussing access to health and dental care in light of the utilitarian
principle of distributive justice and advocating greater discretion in the dental
profession to allow providers to waive copayments).
33. See Thomas Rice et al., The Effectiveness of Consumer Choice in the
Medicare Supplemental Health Insurance Market, 26 HEALTH SERVICES REs.
223, 224(1991).
34. See Medigap: GAO Reports that Major Insurers Often Exclude Medi-
gap Applicants, 4 Health Care Pol'y Rep. (BNA) 37 (Sept. 16, 1996).
35. The number of people in the United States who have some form of
private dental insurance is estimated to be only 100 million. See Friedman et
al., supra note 16, at 131. On the other hand, approximately 29 million
Americans lack adequate health insurance, resulting in "the risk of [exposure
to] large out-of-pocket expenditures for an unusually expensive, catastrophic
illness." Pamela Farley Short, New Estimates of the Underinsured Younger
than 65 Years, 274 J. AM. MED. AssN 1302, 1305 (1995).
36. See Chiodo & Tolle, supra note 30, at 370 (bemoaning the fact that
physicians have the option of "checking a box on the office visit form marked
'bill insurance only'" to treat a poor working patient with a strep throat,
whereas a dentist cannot exercise similar professional judgment and waive
the patient's fee for a toothache).
Several reasons have been offered to explain why waiver of copayment is
accepted by medical but not dental insurers. For example, the ADA House of
[Vol. 82:173
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twenty-three percent of patients with traditional fee-for-service
insurance have benefited from a waiver of copayment by their
medical provider,37 even though dental providers are forbidden
from engaging in the same practice. Additionally, supplemen-
tal insurance is not as widely available or as common in the
dental industry as it is in other sectors of the health insurance
industry, especially the Medicare beneficiary market.
B. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY
The Sherman Act,38 the Clayton Act,39 the Robinson-
Patman Act,' and the Federal Trade Commission Act41 repre-
sent the foundation of federal antitrust laws. The statutory
framework of these antitrust provisions has remained rela-
Delegates recently adopted a policy resolution that most dental care repre-
sents "discretionary" services. See id. Undoubtedly, patients with a dental-
health problem serious enough to warrant a hospital stay might disagree with
this assessment.
37. See Mark S. Lachs et al., The Forgiveness of Coinsurance: Charity or
Cheating?, 322 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 1599, 1599 (1990).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits con-
tracts, combinations, and conspiracies that unreasonably restrain trade.
Specifically, section 1 provides: "Every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States... is hereby declared to be illegal. Every person who shall
make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby de-
dared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony." Id,
Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides: "Every person who shall monopo-
lize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person
or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the sev-
eral States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony." 15
U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1994). Section 3 of the Clayton Act, which encom-
passes standards similar to section 1 of the Sherman Act, prohibits exclusive
dealing arrangements and tying arrangements that may substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly. See id. Section 7 of the Clayton Act
prohibits mergers and acquisitions that may substantially lessen competition
or tend to create a monopoly. See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1994). The Robinson-Patman Act, which amended
section 2 of the Clayton Act, deals with price discrimination in the sale of
goods or commodities. See id.
41. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994). Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
(FTCA) prohibits unfair methods of competition in commerce. See id. While
the Clayton Act permits private damage suits by individuals who were injured
as a result of antitrust activities, private parties are not permitted to bring
suit under the FTCA. See JAMES H. SNEED & DAVID MARX, ANTITRUST:
CHALLENGE OF THE HEALTH CARE FIELD 6 (1990). In addition to these federal
laws, most states also have antitrust laws that correspond to the federal stat-
utes. See id. at 7 (describing state antitrust laws as "little" Sherman, Clayton,
and FTCA provisions and noting that while most state laws parallel the federal
statutes, some state laws may incorporate different substantive standards).
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tively static since 1950.42 In contrast, the health care industry
has undergone substantial change with regard to financing and
delivery of care.43 Antitrust enforcement in health care has
evolved to adapt to these myriad changes.
Since the 1970s, when the Supreme Court first demon-
strated a willingness to apply federal antitrust laws to health
care financing and delivery arrangements,' the health care in-
42. See Celler-Kefauver Amendments of section 7 of the Clayton Act, cl.
1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 18 (1994)).
43. See, e.g., L.R. Gruber et al., From Movement to Industry: The Growth
of HMOs, 7 HEALTH AFFAIRS 197 (1988) (documenting recent changes in the
health care industry vis-a-vis the growth of HMOs and managed care gener-
ally).
44. Three landmark cases set the stage for increased antitrust activity in
the health care industry. The first case, decided by the Supreme Court in
1975, repudiated the traditional argument that "learned professions" (ie.,
physicians, lawyers, and other prestigious, self-regulated professions) did not
fall within the definition of "trade or commerce" and hence were exempt from
antitrust liability under the Sherman Act. See Goldfarb v. Virginia St. Bar,
421 U.S. 773, 781-92 (1975) (invalidating an attorney fee schedule set by the
state bar).
The second noteworthy case, Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex
Hospital, 425 U.S. 738 (1976), entailed a claim by a newly built hospital
against several hospitals in the same market and the local Blue Cross plan.
The new hospital alleged a refusal to deal and market allocation in violation of
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The defendants claimed that their prac-
tices involved only local activity and did not involve "any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States" as the Sherman Act requires. Id. at 743.
In rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court construed "interstate com-
merce" broadly and implied that the federal antitrust laws would apply to in-
stitutional providers and professional associations, as well as individual pro-
viders. See id. See generally KENNETH R. WING, THE LAW AND THE PUBLIC's
HEALTH 214-15 (4th ed. 1994) (discussing the Supreme Court decision in Rex
Hospital and its implications for antitrust enforcement in the health indus-
try).
The third important decision from this era involved the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, which provides an exemption from antitrust laws for the
"business of insurance," but only to the extent that the state regulates such
business and the claim does not involve a boycott, coercion, or intimidation. 15
U.S.C. §§ 1012(b), 1013(b) (1994). The Supreme Court, in Group Life &
Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979), took a narrow
view of the McCarran-Ferguson exception, specifying that the Act is limited to
activities involving the spreading or underwriting of risks, and involving
agreements between the insurer and the policy holder. See id. at 217-24.
In Royal Drug, plaintiffs challenged an arrangement between an insurer
and selected pharmacies to fix the retail prices of drugs and pharmaceuticals
sold to policyholders. See id. at 207. In responding to the plaintiffs claim
that the practice amounted to a group boycott against nonparticipating phar-
macies, the Court noted that the McCarran-Ferguson Act exempted only the
"business of insurance" from antitrust laws and not the "business of insurers."
Id. at 211 (emphasis added). "Arrangements for the purchase of goods and
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dustry has experienced a flurry of antitrust enforcement activ-
ity.45 In particular, both the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
and the Department of Justice (DOJ) have vigorously investi-
gated and enforced antitrust provisions as the health care
market has consolidated through vertical integration, joint
ventures, and mergers and acquisitions." The stated objective
of the FTC has been to prevent market concentration and un-
reasonable restraints on competition in order to preserve con-
sumer choice.47
Regardless of the precise nature of the antitrust claim,
courts have traditionally held that an antitrust complaint
should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless ap-
pears behond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."48 Anti-
services" do not involve any underwriting or spreading of risk, the Court em-
phasized. Id. at 214. Moreover, Congress intended the McCarran-Ferguson
antitrust exemption to involve "[tihe relationship between insurer and in-
sured, the type of policy which could be issued, its reliability, interpretation,
and enforcement." Id. at 215-16. From this language, the Court stated that
the clear focus of the law "was on the relationship between the insurance
company and the policyholder." Id. at 216.
45. See Robert M. Langer, Recent Developments-A Practitioner's Guide
to State Antitrust Health Care Issues, ANTrIRUST, Fall 1995, at 32, 32
(describing the recent state and federal antitrust initiatives in the health care
industry as "unprecedented). See generally U.S. DOJ & FTC, STATEMENTS
OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN THE HEALTH CARE AREA (Sept. 15,
1993) (clarifying the agencies' enforcement intentions with regard to physician
joint ventures, surveys of hospital price and cost information, and hospital
mergers); U.S. DOJ & FTC, STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
POLICY IN THE HEALTH CARE AREA (Sept. 27, 1994) (creating an "antitrust
safety zone" for mergers between general acute-care hospitals and physician
network joint ventures under certain circumstances); U.S. DOJ & FTC,
STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN THE HEALTH CARE AREA
(Aug. 28, 1996) (expanding the use of "rule of reason7 treatment to pricing
agreements among providers organizing joint ventures and multiprovider
networks).
46. See Stephen J. Squeri, Government Investigation and Enforcement:
Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission, in 37TH ANN. AN-
TITRUST L. INST. 539, 624-28 (1996) (describing recent guidelines issued
jointly by the DOJ and FTC regarding antitrust enforcement policy of merg-
ers, joint ventures, and multi-provider networks in the health sector).
47. Mark J. Horoschak, Antitrust Enforcement Policy for Health Care
Markets, in HEALTH CARE REFORM L. INST. 35, 37 (1994), states the general
objectives and central purpose of the FTC's antitrust enforcement program for
the health care market. These guidelines address enforcement in the areas of
hospital mergers, joint ventures, joint purchasing agreements, and physician
networks. See id.
48. Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. at 746; see also Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting
Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962) ("[Slummary procedures should be used spar-
ingly in complex antitrust litigation where motive and intent play leading roles.").
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trust litigation is not, however, exempt from the provisions of
Rules 12(b)(6) and 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Indeed, a recent Supreme Court case even casts doubt on the
notion that courts disfavor summary judgment in antitrust
claims. In Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp.,9 the Court held that summary dismissal is justified
when the factual context of a plaintiffs claim is implausible or
makes no economic sense.50 Scholars have questioned whether
Matsushita really established a new standard for summary
dismissal in antitrust cases, 51 however, and courts continue to
demonstrate an unwillingness to dismiss cases based on the
rationale of earlier, more traditional cases. 2
Another consideration in the debate over summary dis-
missal of antitrust claims is the treble-damages provision of
the Clayton Act.5 3 While the goals of the treble-damages rem-
49. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
50. See id. at 587. In Matsushita, American television manufacturers al-
leged that Japanese manufacturers engaged in a predatory pricing scheme.
The Court rejected plaintiffs claims, stating that "if the factual context ren-
ders respondent's claim implausible-if the claim is one that simply makes no
economic sense-respondents must come forward with more persuasive evi-
dence to support their claim than would otherwise be necessary." Id.; see also
Crown Drug Co., Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 703 F.2d 240, 245-46 (7th Cir. 1983)
(holding that summary resolution of antitrust claims is "especially welcome
where ... the key allegation of the complaint is demonstrably unsupport-
able"); Heart Disease Res. Found. v. General Motors Corp., 463 F.2d 98, 100
(2d Cir. 1972) (affirming the district court's dismissal of an antitrust action
where plaintiffs submitted only a "bare bones statement of conspiracy or of
injury under the antitrust laws without any supporting facts").
51. See Stephen Calkins, Supreme Court Antitrust 1991-92: The Revenge
of the Amici, 61 ANTITRusT L.J. 269, 298 (1993). Calkins focuses on language
in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technology Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992),
where the Supreme Court stated that Matsushita "did not introduce a special
burden on plaintiffs facing summary judgment in antitrust cases" but rather
"demands only that the nonmoving party's inferences be reasonable in order
to reach the jury, a requirement that was not invented, but merely articu-
lated, in that decision." Id. at 468 (internal quotation omitted); see also Ste-
phen Calkins, Summary Judgment, Motions to Dismiss, and Other Examples
of Equilibrating Tendencies in the Antitrust System, 74 GEO. L.J. 1065, 1123
(1986) (opining that Matsushita was "the quintessential overblown antitrust
case" and that the unique and bizarre facts of Matsushita almost always made
the case distinguishable).
52. See, e.g., American Ad Mgmt., Inc. v. GTE Corp., 92 F.3d 781, 788 (9th
Cir. 1996) (stating that "because antitrust cases consist of primarily factual
issues, summary judgment should be used 'sparingly').
53. Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1994), provides for treble
damages and attorney fees for private plaintiffs who suffer actual injury as a
result of conduct by a defendant that violates federal antitrust laws.
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edy in private actions are admirable,54 many commentators ar-
gue that treble damages create inefficiency, encourage merit-
less suits, and cause overdeterrence.55 Appropriate use of
summary dismissal can effectively curb nuisance suits and the
misuse of private antitrust actions for strategic purposes.
Several types of antitrust challenges relate particularly to
the health care context: monopolization, attempted monopoli-
zation, and horizontal restraints of trade in the form of coercive
group boycotts.
1. Monopolization
To state a valid monopolization claim under section 2 of
the Sherman Act, a private plaintiff must allege: (1) possession
of monopoly power in the relevant market, (2) willful acquisition
or maintenance of that power, and (3) causal antitrust injury.5 6
Under the first element, a court will examine whether the
defendant has monopoly power. The Supreme Court defines
monopoly power as "the power to control prices or exclude com-
petition" within a relevant market.5" To identify monopoly
power, a plaintiff must first provide proof of a relevant market.
This analysis involves two aspects: a relevant product market,
which includes products that are "reasonably interchangeable"
with the product allegedly monopolized, and a relevant geographic
market, the geographic area in which the sellers compete for con-
sumers. 5  Under some circumstances, predominant market
54. The private treble-damages provision presumably fosters four goals:
(1) deterrence of violators; (2) compensation of victims; (3) forfeiture of ill-
gotten gains; and (4) punishment for wrongdoing. See Edward D. Cavanagh,
Detrebling Antitrust Damages: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 61 TUL. L.
REV. 777, 783 (1987).
55. See id. at 791 (discussing grounds for criticism of the treble-damages
provision, including: inefficiency, unfairness, overdeterrence, encouragement
of baseless suits, and impairment of ability of American traders effectively to
compete with foreign rivals).
56. Nugget Hydroelectric v. Pacific Gas and Electric Co., 981 F.2d 429,
436 (9th Cir. 1992).
57. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 481
(1992) (citations omitted).
58. Daniel M. Wall, Monopolization Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act,
in 37TH ANNUAL ANTITRUST LAW INSTrrUTE 385, 387-88 (1996). In determin-
ing the relevant product market, a plaintiff must identify demand substitutes,
defined as products that consumers would substitute if the defendant sub-
stantially raised the price of the product, and supply substitutes, which relate
to barrier to entry. See id. On the other hand, defining the relevant geo-
graphic market requires an evaluation of historic patterns of distribution, de-
terminations of the size of the market area, and an analysis of transportation
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share may be used to infer monopoly power.59 The difficulty
with this approach, however, lies in determining what level of
market share constitutes a predominant share.'
To establish the second element of a monopolization claim,
"willful acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power," the
plaintiff must allege "predatory," "anticompetitive," or
"exclusionary" conduct.61 Examples of predatory conduct in-
clude price squeezing and predatory pricing.62 Numerous court
cases involving a monopolization claim revolve around whether
a particular market structure is the result of prohibited mo-
nopolistic behavior or the consequence of a superior product,
business acumen, or historic accident.63
With regard to the final element, in order to demonstrate
an antitrust injury, a plaintiff must show that its injury was
costs. See id. at 388-89.
As a question of fact, courts generally reserve for a jury the right to define
the relevant market. See American Ad Mgmt. v. GTE Corp., 92 F.3d 781, 790
(9th Cir. 1996). Further, in applying Rule 12(b)(6) to an antitrust claim,
courts should be very "circumspect" in applying substantive legal rules to
market conditions. See Storer Cable Comm., Inc. v. Montgomery, 826 F.
Supp. 1338, 1348 (N.D. Ala. 1993). As the Supreme Court advised in Eastman
Kodak: "Legal presumptions that rest on formalistic distinctions rather than
actual market realities are generally disfavored in antitrust laws. Courts
should thus approach antitrust claims on a case-by-case basis, taking care to
examine closely the economic reality of the market at issue." 504 U.S. at 467.
59. See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 481 (ruling that defendene~s com-
mand of 80-95% of the market with no readily available substitutes allowed
plaintiff to avoid summary judgment). Plaintiffs may employ the following
steps to calculate market share: (1) identify all firms in the relevant market,
(2) choose an output measure, and (3) calculate shares by firm. See Wall, su-
pra note 58, at 391. In addition, the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (H1I),
which measures market concentration, also can be used to determine market
share. See id. The HHI can be calculated by squaring the shares of market
participants; values may reach 10,000, which constitutes an absolute monop-
oly. See id.
60. See Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Ragu Foods, Inc., 627 F.2d 919, 925
(9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 921 (1981) (finding that a food manufac-
turer with 65% market share in a prepared spaghetti sauce market suffi-
ciently supported a Sherman Act monopolization claim); Wall, supra note 58,
at 390 (citing cases in which courts implied monopoly power from market
shares varying from 50-90%). But see General Comm. Engineering, Inc. v.
Motorola Comm. & Electronics, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 274, 291-92 (N.D. Cal. 1976)
(finding that a market share of 64-71% did not demonstrate monopoly power
due to the competitive nature of the industry in question).
61. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 602
(1985); see also Wall, supra note 58, at 392 (stating that plaintiff must allege
intent as well as unreasonably exclusionary conduct).
62. See generally Wall, supra note 58, at 392-93 (discussing examples of
prohibited monopolistic conduct and the relevant case law for each example).
63. See id. at 392.
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caused by the predatory conduct, not by competition.64 More
specifically, a plaintiff must prove that the injury is "of the
type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows
from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful."65
2. Attempted Monopolization
The attempt-to-monopolize offense is designed to discour-
age unilateral activity that poses a threat to competition such
that, if left unchecked, would result in the acquisition of monopoly
power.' A claim by a private plaintiff for attempted monopoli-
zation, which also falls under section 2 of the Sherman Act,67
entails four elements: (1) specific intent to control prices or de-
stroy competition, (2) predatory or anticompetitive conduct to
accomplish the monopolization, (3) dangerous probability of
success, and (4) causal antitrust injury. 8
Specific intent and anticompetitive conduct are essential
elements of an attempt claim.69 Proof of intent to prevail over
competitors by improper means can be demonstrated through
direct or indirect evidence but a "dangerous probability of suc-
cess" also must be demonstrated. 0 The Supreme Court firmly
established that this element requires an inquiry into relevant
product and geographic markets and an analysis of a defen-
dant's economic power in that market.71 In Spectrum Sports,
Inc. v. McQuillan, the Supreme Court rejected an approach
used by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that held parties in
64. See Pacific Express, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 959 F.2d 814, 818
(9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1034 (1992).
65. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 334 (1990)
(citations omitted).
66. See Hunt-Wesson Foods, 627 F.2d at 925.
67. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
68. See Pacific Express, 959 F.2d at 817.
69. See Hunt-Wesson Foods, 627 F.2d at 926 (stating that while plaintiff
must allege both specific intent and anticompetitive conduct, such conduct
may imply intent).
70. Id.; see E. THOMAS SULLivAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDER-
STANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS EcoNoMic IMPLICATIONS 241 (2d Ed. 1994)
(discussing the elements of a claim for attempted monopolization and the
proof necessary to establish the element of intent).
71. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993). The
Supreme Court in Spectrum Sports held that establishing that the defendant
engaged in "unfair" or "predatory" tactics is sufficient to prove the necessary
intent, but it is not sufficient to establish "dangerous probability of monopoli-
zation" in an attempt case. Id. at 459.
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violation of the "attempt" provisions of the Sherman Act with-
out such an assessment of market power."
3. Refusal to Deal
In general, competitors need not deal with one another. 3
This freedom to associate, however, is not absolute. In some
circumstances, a competitor may be liable for abuse of its mar-
ket power for refusing to deal without an adequate business
justification.74 Indeed, an affirmative duty to deal exists under
narrow circumstances and is imposed only when the defendant
possesses monopoly power over the product." Whether the
product is competitively essential is also important, but a defen-
dant can prevail nonetheless if it had a valid, efficiency-
enhancing reason for refusing to deal. 6
4. Group Boycotts
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits conduct in which
an agreement is made among competitors not to deal with
third parties.77 Such behavior is often referred to as a group
boycott or a horizontal refusal to deal.78  Early examples of
72. See id.
73. The longstanding Supreme Court doctrine holds that "[i]n the absence
of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the (Sherman] act does not
restrict the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer engaged in an en-
tirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to
parties with whom he will deal." United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S.
300, 307 (1919).
74. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585,
605-11 (1985) (upholding defendanfs liablity for monopolistic exclusionary
behavior where defendant entered into a joint marketing arrangement with
plaintiff that was essential to plaintiffs viability, where defendant did not
provide a business justification for its refusal to deal, and where termination
of the agreement devastated both the plaintiff and consumers).
75. See P. AREEDA & H. HOvENKAmp, ANTrrRusT LAW 664-66 (1996
Supp.) (discussing circumstances in which a monopolist might be required to
cooperate with its competitor).
76. See Patrick J. Ahern, Refusals to Deal After Aspen, 63 ANTITRUST L.
J. 153, 170-82 (1994) (discussing Aspen Skiing and the use of the "business
justification" for refusal to deal); Wall, supra note 58, at 393-95 (describing
the approach that courts take in evaluating a claim based on unilateral re-
fusal to deal and outlining relevant case law).
77. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). The basic statutory elements of a section 1
violation include: (1) a contract, combination or conspiracy among separate
entities, (2) that unreasonably restrains trade, and (3) is in or affects inter-
state or foreign commerce. See Victor E. Grimm, Relationships Among Com-
petitors, in 26TH ANNUAL AN'rTRusT LAw INSTrITUTE 117, 120 (1985).
78. See Horoschak, supra note 47, at 40 (discussing boycotts and threats
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group boycotts in a health care context involved attempts by
physicians to shut out alternative providers or exclude new
types of health plans or financing schemes such as prepaid
capitation. 9
Although group boycotts are traditionally regarded as a
per se antitrust offense when there is market power or control
of an essential facility," depending on how an alleged boycott is
structured, courts may apply the "rule of reason" analysis instead.
A practice that would always or almost always tend to restrict
competition and decrease output will be treated as a per se
violation of the antitrust laws." Such practices are presumed
of boycotts as an example of an invalid horizontal restraint on trade). Gen-
erally, in examining an alleged horizontal restraint on trade or competition,
courts will ask three questions.
First, is the practice "inherently suspect" such that it appears likely to
restrict competition and reduce output? If the activity is not inherently sus-
pect, the court will consider the competitive effects of the practice, including
an analysis of market power. See id. at 37-38.
Second, if the activity or practice is inherently suspect, is there a plausible
efficiency justification for the practice? For example, what is the likelihood that
the practice is capable of creating or increasing competition by reducing costs?
An efficiency justification is plausible if it cannot be rejected without an exten-
sive factualinquiry. See id. at 38
Finally, if an efficiency justification is plausible, is it valid? A justification
is generally not valid if it appears, after further scrutiny, that the parties are
really arguing that the market will operate better with less competition, that
the asserted efficiencies are trivial, or that the restraint is not reasonably
necessary to produce the stated efficiency. See id.
79. See, e.g., Wilk v. American Med. Ass'n, 895 F.2d 352, 362 (7th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 982 (1990) (holding unlawful the AMA boycott of
chiropractors under the "rule of reason"); American Med. Ass'n v. United
States, 317 U.S. 519, 535-36 (1943) (upholding conviction against a medical
association for conspiracy to restrain trade by coercing members and practicing
physicians from accepting employment under a group health membership cor-
poration that paid providers on a risk-sharing prepayment basis).
80. The Supreme Court has long held that certain concerted refusals to
deal or group boycotts are so likely to restrain competition without redeeming
efficiency that they should be condemned as per se violations of the Sherman
Act. See, e.g., Kior's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212-13
(1959) (holding as per se unlawful an agreement between an appliance re-
tailer and several suppliers that constituted a refusal to deal with a compet-
ing retailer).
In general, courts will apply the per se rule where a defendant acts in an
inherently unreasonable manner. See Craig D. Bachman, Per Se Offenses, in
AN2iT uST HEALTH CARE ENFORCEMENT AND ANALYSIS 4 (M. Elizabeth Gee
ed., 1992). Examples of antitrust activity traditionally analyzed under the per
se rule include price-fixing, concerted refusals to deal (group boycotts), divi-
sion of markets, and some tying arrangements. See id. at 8.
81. See, e.g., Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery
and Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 289-90 (1985).
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illegal, and the court will not engage in an elaborate balancing
test between the precise harm incurred and the pro-
competitive effects of the practice.'
Under a rule of reason analysis, which applies to the ma-
jority of antitrust cases, 3 courts will consider: (1) the market or
markets involved, and (2) a determination of whether the acts
or practices unreasonably affect competition.84 Courts have
demonstrated a reluctance to condemn rules adopted by pro-
fessional associations as unreasonable per se.85  As the Su-
preme Court has explained, "we have been slow to condemn
rules adopted by professional associations as unreasonable per
se and, in general, to extend per se analysis to restraints im-
posed in the context of business relationships where the eco-
nomic impact of certain practices is not immediately obvious."86
II. SMILECARE DENTAL GROUP V. DELTA DENTAL
PLAN OF CALIFORNIA
In SmileCare Dental Group v. Delta Dental Plan of Cali-
fornia," the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit took the controversial step of affirming the lower court's
82. The per se approach allows courts to make categorical judgments re-
garding business practices that have been regarded as particularly pernicious,
thereby avoiding the significant costs associated with litigating a rule of rea-
son inquiry. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332,
343-344 (1982); see also Bachman, supra note 80, at 7 (noting that when the
per se rule applies, a court may condemn the defendant's conduct without an
extensive inquiry into the stated purpose of the activity or its actual impact
on the market).
83. The trend in antitrust case law has been away from the cursory
analysis applied under a per se approach and toward a rule of reason ap-
proach. See SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 70, at 85. This is especially
true if the court presiding over the case has not had previous experience with
the practice challenged in the case at hand. See id.; see also Douglas C. Ross,
Rule of Reason Analysis: The 'Quality" Defense in Health Care Cases, in
ANTITRUST HEALTH CARE ENFORCEMENT AND ANALYsIS 13 (M. Elizabeth Gee
ed., 1992) (reporting that the vast majority of restraints alleged to be anti-
competitive are evaluated under the "rule of reason" approach).
84. See WING, supra note 44, at 223-24 (outlining the basic analysis that
courts take under a "rule of reason" approach).
85. See F.T.C. v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458-59 (1986)
(examining a practice that resembled a group boycott on the part of dentists
and their association under the rule of reason rather than applying a per se
analysis).
86. Id.
87. 88 F.3d 780 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 583 (1996).
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dismissal of the plaintiffs antitrust complaint 8 for failure to
state a claim.89 The SmileCare court reached its decision by
accepting the lower court's conclusion that Delta Dental's pol-
icy of prohibiting supplemental insurance payments did not
have any anticompetitive effects and that the policy repre-
sented a legitimate business practice.9 Further, the court af-
firmed the lower court's dismissal of SmileCare's group boycott
claim on the grounds that Delta Dental was not engaged in a
conspiracy. 91
A. ANTICOMPETTVE EFFECTS OF DELTA DENTAL'S POLICY
In its complaint, SmileCare alleged that Delta Dental pos-
sessed market power in the dental insurance market by virtue
of its sixty percent market share for dental insurance in the
state and its nonexclusive contractual relationship with ninety-
five percent of California dentists.92 SmileCare also alleged
that Delta Dental's policy prohibiting supplemental insurance
payments was calculated to eliminate SmileCare's dental plans
88. SmileCare filed suit against Delta Dental on September 8, 1993, alleging
that Delta Dental's policy prohibiting participating providers from accepting sup-
plemental insurance payments in lieu of patient copayments violated section 2 of
the Sherman Act. See id. at 782. Specifically, SmileCare brought a claim for
monopolization, attempted monopolization, and refusal to deal See id. at 783.
Following dismissal of these claims with leave to amend, SmileCare amended
its complaint and added a group boycott claim. See id. The lower court dis-
missed the amended complaint on July 25, 1994. See id.
In addition to federal claims under the Sherman Act, SmileCare also filed
supplemental claims under state law alleging tortious interference, trade li-
bel, breach of contract, and violations of the California Health and Safety
Code and California Business and Professions Code. See SmileCare, 858 F.
Supp. at 1037. The lower court dismissed SmleCare's state law claims with-
out prejudice, however, and the appellate court did not consider those claims.
See SmileCare, 88 F.3d at 782 n.1.
89. See SmileCare, 88 F.Sd at 783. The court stated that "[dismissal for
failure to state a claim is appropriate where 'the complaint states no set of
facts which, if true, would constitute an antitrust offense, notwithstanding its
conclusory language regarding the elimination of competition and improper
purpose." Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The lower court also noted
the appropriateness of a 12(b)(6) motion, given the extraordinary costs associ-
ated with discovery in antitrust actions. SmileCare, 858 F. Supp. at 1037.
90. In its concluding remarks, the SmileCare court stated that "[biecause
Delta Dental's co-payment plan is concededly legitimate, and because Smile-
Care has failed to allege that Delta Dentars enforcement of its no-waiver
clause has any anticompetitive effects, we affirm the district court [in dismissing
the complaint]. 88 F.3d. at 786.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 782.
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from the market and maintain its dominant market position.93
The court declined to address the issue of market power and
disregarded SmileCare's allegations of antitrust injury.94 In-
stead, the primary issue on appeal, according to the court, was
whether Delta Dental's policy of prohibiting providers from ac-
cepting copayments from supplemental insurers had any anti-
competitive effects.95
In reaching its conclusion that the policy did not, in fact,
have any impermissible anticompetitive effects, the court made
two findings. First, on the basis of the lower court's analysis
and precedent, the court found the copayment policy valid.96
Second, the court affirmed the lower court's finding that the
parties were not true competitors because SmileCare's "Coverage
Plus" supplemental plan did not compete with Delta Dental's
primary plan.
1. The Validity and Merits of Copayment Plans
The SmileCare court seemed to accept the argument that
insurance creates a "moral hazard" by desensitizing patients to
the cost of care, thereby inducing them to seek more care than
they would if the services were not covered.97 Despite approval
93. See id. at 785. Since virtually all of California dentists contract with
Delta Dental, the state's largest dental insurer, the logical result of providers'
refusal to deal with SmileCare is the elimination of the plan from the market.
SmileCare also claimed that as a result of Delta Dental's policy, consumers
were deprived of full-coverage dental care. See id.
94. The SmileCare court cited two reasons for disregarding the issue of
market share or market power. First, Delta Dental conceded that it possessed
market power for dental insurance. See id. at 783 n.2. Second, the court
noted that market share does not necessarily equate to monopoly power since
other factors such as ease of entry must also be considered. See id.
95. While acknowledging the amount of time and effort that the parties
devoted to evaluating the market benefits of insurance copayment plans, the
court discounted the discussions and clarified that the "key issue... [was]
whether Delta Dental's refusal to recognize as contractually valid a participating
dentist's acceptance of co-payment from a supplemental insurer rather than
from the patient herself [had] any impermissible anticompetitive effects." Id.
at 783-84. Moreover, the court added that potential harm to SmileCare was
not sufficient to establish an antitrust claim, since "the antitrust laws protect
competition, not competitors." Id. at 784 n.3 (citations omitted).
96. Although the court noted that previous court cases had addressed the
legality of copayment plans and waiver prohibition clauses and that the validity
of copayment plans was not the primary issue in this case, the SmileCare
court nevertheless revisited the lower court's discussion of "moral hazard"
theory and non-assignment clauses. SmileCare, 88 F.3d at 783.
97. See id at 784. Specifically, the court stated that "insurance creates a
moral hazard' because it desensitizes patients to cost and induces them to
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of the actuarial soundness of SmileCare's supplemental dental
plan by the California Department of Corporations,98 the court
noted the economic validity of mandatory copayments because
they offset the adverse economic effect of insurance.99 Manda-
tory cost-sharing is also legally valid, the court found, because
various cases have upheld the use of copayments to hold down
the cost of medical care.1" Based on these principles, the court
in dicta recognized that payments made directly to dental pro-
viders were equivalent to a waiver of copayments and could
therefore be prohibited. 10
seek inordinate amounts of care." Id.
98. First Amended Complaint for Plaintiff at 13, SmileCare Dental
Group v. Delta Dental Plan of Cal., 858 F. Supp. 1035 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (No. 93-
5437 RG).
99. See SmileCare, 88 F.3d at 784. The court restated the lower court's
reasoning that mandatory copayments combat the effect of the moral hazard
of insurance by "forcing patients to reflect upon the cost of services and mod-
erate their demands for treatment." Id (citations omitted).
100. See id. at 783. The court stated that Kennedy v. Connecticut General
Life Insurance Co., 924 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1991), established the legality of co-
payment plans by holding that insurers have a legal entitlement to create co-
payment requirements. See SmileCare, 88 F.3d at 783. The Ninth Circuit
adopted this holding in Davidowitz v. Delta Dental Plan of California, Inc.,
946 F.2d 1476 (9th Cir. 1991).
The dissent in SmileCare disagreed with the majority's use of the hold-
ings in Davidowitz and Kennedy because these cases based their interpreta-
tions on ERISA rather than the Sherman Act. See SmileCare, 88 F.3d at 787
(Pregerson, J., dissenting). While the Davidowitz court faced the issue of
whether ERISA barred a non-assignment clause; the SmileCare court exam-
ined the anitcompetitiveness of Delta Dental's conduct, which forced Smile-
Care and other supplemental plans out of the dental insurance market. See
id.
101. See SmileCare, 88 F.3d at 784. Although SmileCare argued that
supplemental payments acted as a substitute for copayments rather than as a
waiver, the lower court asserted that this distinction was "incorrect as a mat-
ter of law." SmileCare, 858 F. Supp. at 1039. "So long as a patient is not
making the co-payments himself," the lower court added, "he is desensitized
to cost, even though he must pay a premium for the supplemental insurance."
Id.
In dicta, the SmileCare court noted that that supplemental insurance
plans were not objectionable because they insulated patients from out-of-
pocket costs but because they paid providers directly rather than indirectly
through the patients. See id. at 784. In other words, Delta Dental would not
oppose the supplemental payments if SmileCare made them directly to the
patients who, in turn, mailed a check to their dentist. See id. Here the court
made an analogy to a patient's rich aunt or best friend who paid the copay-
ment on behalf of the patient. See id. If supplemental payments were made
directly to the patient, such an arrangement would be comparable to the rich
aunt's payment, because patients would be forced to "consider the pinch to
their own wallets." Id.
The issue of copayments, the court stated, turned not on cost insulation,
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2. SmileCare and Delta Dental as Competitors
The court provided a second reason for denying Smile-
Care's allegations that Delta Dental's policy was anticompeti-
tive: the parties were not competitors.102 In reaching this con-
clusion, the SmileCare court reiterated the lower court's
finding, which rejected SmileCare's argument that its
"Coverage Plus" supplemental plan, combined with Delta Den-
tal's primary plan, was in competition with Delta Dental's full
coverage plan. 0 3 According to the court, as a matter of law, the
definition of competitor precluded Delta Dental from competing
with itself.104 Hence, as long as Delta Dental did not act to
but on contractual terms. The primary plan policy required patients to sub-
mit copayments, and the provider contract with Delta Dental prohibited
waiver of copayments. See id. The court noted that if an insurance policy re-
quires copayments, then the physician must create a legal obligation for the
patient to make such payments. See id. In fact, the lower court went one step
further to say that patients enrolled in a primary plan that requires manda-
tory copayments are precluded from obtaining supplemental insurance. See
SmileCare, 858 F. Supp. at 1038.
The lower court ultimately concluded, and the appellate court did not re-
fute, that forcing providers to honor mandatory copayments is actually pro-
competitive, because it makes primary plans more feasible, thereby increasing
consumer choice, reducing insurance costs, and enabling employers to furnish
broader coverage. See SmileCare, 858 F. Supp. at 1038. According to the
lower court, the Ninth and Seventh Circuits both recognize that the enforce-
ment of contractual mandatory copayment provisions fosters competition by
protecting against the moral hazard of insurance. See id. The appellate court
referred to this language in its opinion. See SmileCare, 88 F.3d at 784. By
eliminating the anticipated benefit of a reduced demand for services on the
part of the primary plan, the court speculated that the SmileCare supplemen-
tal plan distorted the actuarial basis for Delta Dental's copayment plan by de-
sensitizing patients to the costs of care. See id. In fact, in response to in-
creased costs caused by patients seeking inordinate amounts of care, Delta
Dental would likely raise its prices or abandon copayment plans altogether as
unprofitable, with a resulting harm to consumers. See id. at 784 n.4. Based
on this analysis, the court determined that the Delta Dental policy was not
anticompetitive.
102. The SmileCare court adopted the lower court's finding that
"SmileCare's supplemental insurance plan does not compete with Delta Den-
tal's primary plan." Id. at 785 (citing SmileCare, 858 F. Supp. at 1039).
103. SmileCare argued that patients who wished to obtain 100% coverage
for dental care had two options: (1) they could purchase the more expensive
Delta Dental full coverage option, which did not include copayments, or (2)
they could purchase both a Delta Dental primary plan, which included copay-
ments, and a SmileCare supplemental plan. See SmileCare, 858 F. Supp. at
1039. These options would compete with each other, according to SmileCare,
thereby reducing the cost of the full coverage option. See id. Further, Smile-
Care asserted that by disallowing supplemental payments, Delta Dental
"stamps out supplemental plans," a decidedly anticompetitive result. Id-
104. See SmileCare, 858 F. Supp. at 1039 (asserting that SmileCare's alle-
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crush its competition in the primary plan market, it did not act
anticompetitively10 5
B. DELTA DENTAL'S LEGITIMATE BUSINESS INTEREST
In response to SmileCare's antitrust claim for "refusal to
deal,"0 6 the court concluded that even if the parties were com-
petitors, the claim should be dismissed on the basis of Delta
Dental's "valid business reason."107 The court noted that al-
gation that Delta Dental's policy against supplemental payment allows the
insurer to insulate itself from competition is "incorrect as a matter of law,"
since, by the very definition of "competitor," Delta Dental cannot compete
with itself). Competitive discipline comes from competing primary plans
rather than supplemental plans, according to the lower court. See id.
In fact, according to the SmileCare court, SmileCare did not compete with
Delta Dental, but rather, it attempted to encroach upon Delta Dental's
method of disciplining its insureds. See SmileCare, 88 F.3d at 785. Adopting
the lower court's conclusion, the court stated that rather than acting as com-
petitors, "SmileCare has found a niche in the coverage 'gap' created by Delta
Dental's co-payment plan, and now seeks to impose on Delta Dental its own
way of doing business." Id. In concluding its argument, the court declared
that SmileCare could not identify any antitrust law which required Delta
Dental to "modify a legitimate way of doing business" in order to allow Smile-
Care to sell its insurance. Id.
The dissent took issue with the conclusion reached by the majority and
the lower court that SmileCare and Delta Dental are not competitors. See
SmileCare, 88 F.3d at 787. To reach such a conclusion, the court must con-
duct a factual inquiry into the relevant market. See id. (Pregerson, J., dis-
senting) (citing Thurman Industries, Inc. v. Pay 'N Pak Stores, Inc., 875 F.2d
1369, 1374 (9th Cir. 1989)). Based on the procedural posture of the case, the
dissent argued that the lower court erred by finding that the two plans did not
compete because it did not review any evidence. See id. Likewise, according
to the dissent, the SmileCare majority erred by accepting the lower court's
conclusion. See id.
105. See SmileCare, 858 F. Supp. at 1040.
106. In its complaint, SmileCare contended that Delta Dental improperly
refused to deal with the SmileCare Coverage Plus supplemental plan. See
SmileCare, 88 F.3d at 785. To support its claim under section 2 of the Sher-
man Act, SmileCare cited Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.,
472 U.S. 585, 602-05 (1985), for the proposition that a refusal to deal can con-
stitute an antitrust violation without a legitimate business justification. See
SmileCare, 88 F.3d at 785.
107. SmileCare, 88 F.3d at 786. The dissent rejected the approach taken
by the majority in SmileCare. Specifically, the dissent noted that a businessjustification was an affirmative defense to anticompetitive conduct. See id. at
787. Whether a valid business reason justified a monopolist's conduct was a
question of fact, as the majority stated. See id. According to the dissent, the
majority erred in deciding the question of Delta Dental's legitimate business
justification on a motion to dismiss. See id.
According to the dissent, the SmileCare court accepted Delta Dental's as-
serted defense as true while repudiating SmileCare's allegations. See id. at
788. On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court should have
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though the existence of a valid business reason for prohibiting
supplemental plans was normally a question of fact, based on
its preceding analysis regarding the validity of mandatory co-
payment plans, Delta Dental's legitimate business reason was
"a foregone conclusion requiring no further analysis."108
Moreover, the court noted that Delta Dental's primary plan
predated SmileCare's supplemental plan.' °9 More specifically,
the SmileCare court accepted the lower court's finding that
Delta Dental did not discontinue an existing arrangement or
implement its policy prohibiting waiver of copayments in re-
sponse to SmileCare's supplemental plan.'10
C. LACK OF CONSPIRACY TO ESTABLISH A GROUP BOYCOTT
Finally, in dismissing SmileCare's group boycott claim, the
court reasoned that SmileCare failed to allege the essential
element of a conspiracy between Delta Dental and another
party.'1 While SmileCare cited Kor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, Inc."2 to support its claim that Delta Dental used its
market power to induce dentists to "boycott" SmileCare's sup-
plemental plans,1 3 the court distinguished Kor's on the
declined to consider the affirmative defense and determine only whether
SmileCare's well pleaded facts, if true, could constitute an antitrust claim for
which the plaintiff was entitled to relief. See id.
108. See SmileCare, 88 F.3d at 786.
109. See id. In Aspen Skiing Co., a case on which SmileCare relied on for
its argument that Delta Dental's policy represented a "refusal to deal," a ski
resort backed out of a longstanding ticket-sharing arrangement that it had
made with a smaller competitor. See 472 U.S. at 604-10 The Supreme Court
upheld a claim made by the smaller competitor for "refusal to deal," because
the resort's decision to discontinue the arrangement, which changed the char-
acter of the market, was not based on efficiency or a legitimate business rea-
son. See id.
110. See SmileCare, 88 F.3d at 786.
111. See id. (stating that failure to allege a conspiracy between Delta Den-
tal and any other party precludes SmileCare from bringing a group boycott
claim). SmileCare alleged that Delta Dental used its dominant position in the
market to coerce or induce dentists to boycott its supplemental plan. Id. at
785.
112. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
113. In Klor's, the plaintiff and the defendant were competing retail stores
for household items. See id. at 209. Kor's took steps to draw customers away
from its competitor, and Broadway-Hale responded by persuading manufac-
turers and distributors not to sell to Kor's or to sell goods on unfavorable
terms. See id. at 209. The Supreme Court held that Broadway-Hale's actions
violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, because the alleged conspiracy
with manufacturers and wholesalers was designed to drive a competitor out of
business. See id. at 209-10.
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ground that Delta Dental's policy was actually procompetitive
rather than anticompetitive and because the parties in this
case were not competitors.11 4
III. SMILECARE: QUASHING A LEGITIMATE
ANTITRUST CLAIM
A. ASSESSING ANTITRUST CLAIMS IN THE DENTAL INSURANCE
INDUSTRY
The SmileCare decision takes antitrust enforcement in
health care back twenty years to a time when courts gave the
industry a substantial amount of deference. 5 In light of recent
changes in the U.S. health care system with regard to financing
and delivery arrangements,116 courts are now generally more
willing to examine the activities and conduct of insurers and
providers.1 ' The dental industry and the supplemental insur-
ance industry are no exception.1 '
Recent Supreme Court cases cast doubt on the traditional
view that federal antitrust claims are subject to a higher stan-
dard of review for summary dismissal motions than other
claims.1 9 The potential for high costs associated with discov-
114. See SmileCare, 88 F.3d at 786. Again citing the lower court's reason-
ing, the SmileCare court distinguished the Klor's case because "SmileCare
and Delta Dental are not competitors." Id.; see supra note 97 (discussing the
lower courts determination that copayments actually encourage competition).
115. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (tracing the development of
antitrust enforcement in the health care industry from a time in which the
industry enjoyed a virtual exemption from federal antitrust laws to the pres-
ent, in which courts demonstrate a willingness to find health care defendants
liable for antitrust violations).
116. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing recent monu-
mental changes in the U.S. health care system).
117. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (noting that the FTC and
the DOJ have vigorously enforced federal antitrust provisions in light of
changes in the health care market).
118. See supra note 46 (discussing recent DOJ and FYC guidelines regarding
antitrust enforcement in the health industry). Despite the court's high-handed ap-
proach and apparent disregard for the supplemental insurance industry, supple-
mental insurers need not be concerned that the holding in this case could
have broader implications for their line of business. Based on recent holdings
in other jurisdictions and the general policy statements promulgated by the
FTC and DOJ expressing an increased rather than a decreased willingness to
pursue antitrust enforcement in health care, the decision in SmileCare ap-
pears to be an aberration rather than a trend.
119. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text (discussing recent cases
holding that courts should summarily dismiss antitrust cases only when fac-
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ery and the incentive for meritless suits that accompanies the
treble-damages remedy1 20 may seem to justify enthusiastic
application of the summary dismissal tools set forth in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The standard for dismissing
an antitrust claim is not lower than it is for other claims, how-
ever. The Supreme Court has held that such claims should be
dismissed only if the factual context of a plaintiff's claim is
implausible or makes no economic sense. 121 Thus, if the stan-
dard of review for antitrust cases is equivalent to that applied
in other contexts, a plaintiffs allegations set forth in the com-
plaint should be read broadly and liberally.12
In SmileCare, however, rather than accepting the plain-
tiffs allegations as true and applying the standard of review
required in considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court rejected
the claim and, instead, embraced Delta Dental's affirmative de-
fense. 123 That Delta Dental's policy of prohibiting supplemen-
tal insurance would both eliminate consumer choice for full
dental insurance coverage and "stamp out" all competition for
such coverage should have alerted the court to potential anti-
competitive conduct.
B. SMILECARE'S CLAIM SHOULD HAVE SURVIVED DISMISSAL
The SmileCare court erroneously upheld the dismissal of
SmileCare's antitrust action. Because SmileCare alleged
predatory conduct with enough sufficiency, according to the
generally accepted standard of review in antitrust cases,
SmileCare's complaint should have survived a motion to dis-
miss for failure to state a claim. In addition, instead of ac-
knowledging the importance of Delta Dental's market share for
dental insurance and the fact that the insurer contracts with
tual claims make no economic sense).
120. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (discussing criticism of the
Clayton Act's treble-damages provision, including encouragement of baseless
suits).
121. See supra note 50 (identifying cases in which courts found summary
dismissal of antitrust claims justified for lack of support or lack of sound eco-
nomic rationale).
122. See supra note 58 (citing Storer Cable Comm., Inc. v. Montgomery,
826 F. Supp. 1338 (N.D. ALa 1993), for the proposition that the liberal system
of notice pleading applies "in fill force" to antitrust actions).
123. See supra note 107 (noting the dissent's accusation that the majority
in SmileCare turned the standard of review "on its head" by repudiating
SmileCare's allegations but accepting Delta Dental's defense as a "foregone
conclusion").
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nearly 100% of the providers in California,124 the court mistakenly
focused on Delta Dental's defense to the claim and the validity of
copayment plans. Finally, in its high-handed approach toward
supplemental insurance for dental care, the court ignored the
widely accepted market for supplemental insurance in other
sectors of the health care industry.1' s
1. The Court Erred in Basing its Decision on the Lower
Court's "Finding" that Delta Dental's Policy Had No
Anticompetitive Effect
The Ninth Circuit's decision to affirm the dismissal of
SmileCare's antitrust claims centered on the court's "finding"
that Delta Dental's policy had no anticompetitive effects. 126 In
reaching this decision, the court reasoned that the parties to
this action were not competitors, 127 and that because policies
prohibiting waivers of copayments were economically and le-
gally valid, prohibitions against supplemental insurance pay-
ments were correspondingly valid.12
In light of the procedural posture of the case, 129 the court's
determination that Delta Dental's policy had no anticompeti-
tive effect was incorrect for two reasons. First, in evaluating
the prohibition of copayment waivers, the majority relied on
cases interpreting the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA) rather than the Sherman Act. 130 The ERISA cases
are irrelevant to the SmileCare case, because ERISA protects
124. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (stating that Delta Dental
holds a 60% market share for dental insurance and contracts with 95% of the
dentists in California).
125. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text (discussing the impor-
tance and prevalence of Medicare supplemental insurance to offset out-of-
pocket costs of health care for beneficiaries).
126. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text (discussing the court's
focus on whether or not the policy against supplemental payments had any
anticompetitive effects).
127. See supra notes 102-105 and accompanying text (discussing the
court's finding that Delta Dental and SmileCare are not competitors).
128. See supra notes 97, 99-100 (outlining the court's discussion of the va-
lidity and merits of copayment plans).
129. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (noting that SmileCare's
antitrust complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim); see also supra
notes 50-52 (outlining the standard for summary dismissal of antitrust
claims).
130. See supra note 100 (noting that the cases cited by the SmileCare court
addressed the issue of whether a non-assignment clause was barred by
ERISA).
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employee benefits, whereas antitrust laws protect competition
and consumer choice. Although no previous cases had considered
the validity of copayment plans in an action under the Sherman
Act, the court placed undue reliance on cases decided within a
different statutory framework.
Second, the court improperly equated waivers of copay-
ment with supplementary insurance payments.13 1 The court's
conclusion ignored the existence and legitimacy of supplemen-
tal insurance in other sectors of the health care industry and
the position of the California Attorney General that such waivers
are acceptable under state law.132  Ironically, Delta Dental
admitted that it would not oppose the supplemental payments
if they were made to patients who would then mail a check to
their dentist. 133 Under this arrangement, according to Delta,
patients must "consider the pinch to their own wallets."134 This
assertion makes no sense if Delta truly desires to sensitize pa-
tients to the cost of care, because patients pay the cost of care
in form only and not in substance. In sum, the court's analysis
that supplemental insurance plans were objectionable, not be-
cause they insulated patients from out-of-pocket costs but because
they paid providers directly rather than indirectly, contradicts the
assertion that supplementary insurance payments are equiva-
lent to waivers of copayment.
The court also erred in finding that the parties do not
compete against each other. Although SmileCare may not
compete with Delta Dental in the market for partial coverage
that includes cost sharing, SmileCare's supplemental plan
combined with Delta Dental's primary plan certainly competes
in the market for full coverage. 135 Importantly, determining
the characteristics of the relevant product market, including
131. See supra note 101 (quoting the lower court's conclusion that Smile-
Care's argument that supplemental payments are a substitute for copayments
rather than a waiver is "incorrect as a matter oflaw").
132. See supra text accompanying note 33 (discussing the role of supple-
mental insurance for elderly Medicare beneficiaries).
133. See supra note 101 (discussing the comparison between supplemental
payments made directly to patients and a rich aunt paying a patient's copay-
ment bill).
134. SmileCare, 88 F.3d at 784 n4.
135. See supra note 103 (noting that patients who wish to obtain 100%
coverage for dental care can either purchase Delta Dental or other full cover-
age or a Delta Dental primary plan combined with a SmileCare supplemental
plan).
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the issue of competition between parties, requires a factual in-
quiry, thus making summary dismissal inappropriate.136
2. SmileCare's Claims Asserted More than a "Bare Bones
Statement"
a. SmileCare Asserted a Valid Claim for Monopolization
In order to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim, SmileCare must allege more than a "bare bones state-
ment" of injury under the antitrust laws, and the factual con-
text of the claim must be plausible.137 Although the court failed
to discern a legitimate claim for monopolization on the basis of
the complaint, a closer look at SmileCare's allegations reveals
a different picture. An objective review demonstrates that
SmileCare alleged each of the elements necessary to establish
a claim for monopolization under the Sherman Act with ade-
quate sufficiency. 138
SmileCare met the first element of a claim for monopoh-
zation, possession of monopoly power in the relevant market.
For purposes of the motion to dismiss, Delta Dental conceded
that it possessed market power in the relevant geographic and
product markets. 139 SmileCare established the second element
of a claim, willful acquisition or maintenance of market power,
by demonstrating not only the unreasonableness of Delta Den-
tal's policy but also by asserting that the policy would ulti-
mately eliminate all supplemental insurance plans from the
market and create a virtual monopoly for Delta Dental's full
coverage option. 14° Delta Dental's prohibition against supple-
136. See supra note 58 (noting that, as a question of fact, a court ordinarily
reserves for a jury the right to define the relevant market); see also supra note
104 (citing the dissenfs assertion that the question of whether Delta Dental
and SmileCare are competitors is a question of fact).
137. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text (summarizing the stan-
dard for summary dismissal of antitrust claims).
138. See supra text accompanying note 56 (outlining the elements of a
claim for monopolization). Whether or not SmileCare's claim would prevail on
its merits at trial is not at issue here. Rather, the issue is whether Smile-
Care's claims are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim.
139. SmileCare, 88 F.3d at 783. Despite this concession, the SmileCare
court declined to address the issue of market share or market power. See supra
note 94.
140. See supra note 93 (restating SmileCare's allegation that Delta Den-
tal's policy effectively eliminates supplemental plans from the dental insur-
ance market and maintaining that this result is decidedly anticompetitive).
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mental insurance is unreasonable in light of the determination
by the California Department of Corporations that SmileCare's
plan is actuarially sound"' and the California Attorney Gen-
eral's acceptance of the practice of waiving dental copayment
fees.4 2 As SmileCare alleged in its complaint, elimination of
supplemental insurance plans from the dental insurance mar-
ket negatively affects consumer choice. 43
In reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
such profound adverse effects in a market illustrate predatory
and anticompetitive behavior. 44 Moreover, despite the court's
rationale that the policy is both economically and legally
valid,145 such a prohibition is virtually unheard of in other sec-
tors of the health care industry. 146
With regard to the final element of a monopolization claim,
Delta Dental's policy is undoubtedly injurious to SmileCare be-
cause of the effect the prohibition has on SmileCare's primary
line of business. The policy prevents SmileCare from selling its
product to a substantial proportion of the dental insurance
market in California.' 47 Consumers also suffer as a result of
the Delta Dental policy in that those who wish to obtain total
141. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (noting the position of the
California Department of Corporation).
142. See supra note 31 (noting the position of the California Attorney Gen-
eral).
143. See supra note 93 (stating SmileCare's allegations that consumers
were deprived of fill-coverage dental care by virtue of Delta Dental's policy).
144. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (noting that predatory, anti-
competitive, or exclusionary conduct can establish the second element of a
monopoly claim). Delta Dental conceded, however, that it would not oppose
supplemental payments if SmileCare made them directly to patients who then
mailed the check to their dentist. See supra note 101 (noting Delta Dental's
position on supplemental insurance payments which first pass through the
insured).
145. See supra notes 97, 99-100 and accompanying text (discussing the
courtfs reasoning that mandatory copayments are economically valid in that
they offset the moral hazard of insurance and legally valid based on prece-
dent).
146. See supra notes 33-37 (discussing the widespread use of supplemental
insurance plans in the medical sector)
147. Only 40% of the U.S. population has dental insurance. See supra text
accompanying note 16 (estimating the percent of the U.S. population with
dental insurance). Of the limited California proportion of the population with
insurance, Delta Dental controls the largest market share, and Delta Dental
contracts with nearly all of the dentists in the state. See supra text accompa-
nying note 92. These numbers suggest that by prohibiting supplemental in-
surance payments, Delta Dental has denied SmileCare access to a substantial
proportion of its potential customer base.
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coverage without purchasing the more expensive full coverage
option are forbidden from purchasing SmileCare's "Coverage
Plus" product or any other supplemental insurance product. 148
b. SmileCare Also Alleged Attempted Monopolization with
Enough Sufficiency
To establish a claim for attempted monopolization, a
plaintiff must allege specific intent to destroy competition and
a dangerous probability of success.1 49 The pleadings in the
SmileCare case satisfy these elements.
Delta Dental's policy goes beyond a mere intention to ex-
clude competition and expand its own business for full-
coverage dental insurance. If Delta Dental wanted to maintain
its market share for full coverage customers, it could have lowered
its prices to be more competitive with the supplemental insur-
ance plan when combined with its own partial coverage option.
Instead of lowering prices, however, Delta Dental chose to cut
out its competitor altogether. 150
Attempting to acquire market power is not, in and of itself,
illegal under the antitrust laws. 151 An intention to prevail over
competitors using improper or unfair means is, however, pro-
hibited under the Sherman Act, and this element can be estab-
148. See supra note 103 (addressing SmileCare's claim that patients who
wished to obtain 100% coverage for dental care could either purchase Delta
Dental full coverage or a Delta Dental primary plan combined with a Smile-
Care or other supplemental plan, which is considerably cheaper). Strict en-
forcement of the Delta Dental policy leaves consumers with only one choice,
the more expensive full coverage option. See supra note 101. Thus, in addi-
tion to extinguishing SmileCare's customer base, the Delta Dental policy also
adversely effects consumer choice.
149. See supra text accompanying note 68 (outlining the elements neces-
sary to establish a claim for attempted monopolization).
150. See supra note 103 (quoting SmileCare's allegation that Delta Den-
tal's conduct is anticompetitive because it "stamps out supplemental insur-
ance plans"). The lower court rejected this assertion by arguing that Smile-
Care and Delta Dental are not competitors. See supra Part I1A.2 (responding
to SmileCare's claim that Delta Dental's conduct is anticompetitive by stating
that the parties are not in competition with each other).
As the dissent points out, the lower court erred in rejecting SmileCare's
allegations, since on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, facts al-
leged by the nonmoving party are presumed to be true. See note 104
(discussing the lower court's error in rejecting claims made by SmileCare de-
spite the procedural posture of the case).
151. Pacific Engineering & Production Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d
790, 795 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977) (citing the nonac-
tionability under federal law of a mere intention to expand one's business at
the expense of a competitor's).
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lished through direct or indirect evidence. 52 Whether or not
SmileCare would have been able to produce this evidence is
unclear. By allowing the complaint to be dismissed at an early
stage in the litigation, the SmileCare court precluded discovery
in this action. What is clear, however, is that Delta Dental had
the capacity to eliminate competition in the market for full
coverage based on its predominate market share.'53 This fact
was also germane to establishing the "dangerous probability"
element of an attempted monopolization claim, which requires
an inquiry into relevant product and geographic markets and
an analysis of a defendant's economic power in that market."
c. SmileCare's Claim for Group Boycott Should Have
Survived a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
Applying the standard of review under Rule 12(b)(6),' 55
SmileCare's claims asserting a "group boycott" also should
have survived dismissal. Although the court declined to con-
sider SmileCare's group boycott claim on the grounds that
Delta Dental was not engaged in a conspiracy,'56 given the es-
tablished ties between Delta Dental and dentists,'57 an argu-
ment could be made that a conspiracy did, in fact, exist. By
reason of the traditionally close relationship shared between
the plan and the dental profession, dentists might willingly ac-
cept and abide by contract terms imposed by Delta Dental. 58
A counter-argument could be made, however, that dentists
are not necessarily unified in their approach to payment and
insurance issues. For example, the dental profession is cur-
rently engaged in an earnest debate over the ethics of waiving
patient copayments. 159  Nevertheless, even if individual den-
152. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (discussing proof of intent
in an attempted monopolization claim).
153. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (discussing the potential
impact of Delta Dental's policy).
154. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text (discussing the inquiry
required to establish the "dangerous probability" element of an attempted
monopolization claim).
155. See supra notes 50-52 (outlining the standard of review for a Rule
12(b)(6) motion).
156. See supra note 111.
157. See supra note 29.
158. See also supra note 111 (discussing SmileCare's argument that Delta
Dental used its dominant position in the market to induce, or possibly coerce,
dentists to boycott SmileCare's supplemental plan).
159. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
204 [Vol. 82:173
1997] SUMMARY DISMISSAL & ANTITRUST 205
tists opposed Delta Dental's policy regarding supplemental in-
surance payments, the state dental association might have
agreed to accept and uphold the provision. Since a conspiracy
is not implausible under these circumstances, SmileCare's
claim should have survived a motion to dismiss in order to give
the plaintiff a chance to engage in discovery.
Even if the SmileCare court was reluctant to declare Delta
Dental's policy invalid per se,16° it should have applied a "rule
of reason" approach.' 6' This approach would have required the
court to consider the market or markets involved and whether
the acts or practices unreasonably affect competition.1 62 Again,
consideration of the dental insurance market, the unreason-
ableness of Delta Dental's policy, and its adverse effects on
competition should have been more fully explored in discovery.
Since the factual context of SmileCare's claim is credible,
summary dismissal was inappropriate. 163
C. GIVEN THE PROCEDURAL POSTURE OF THE SMILECARE CASE,
THE COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE CONSIDERED DELTA
DENTAL'S BUSINESS JUSTIFICATION
The SmileCare court focused on the legitimacy of Delta
Dental's prohibition against supplemental insurance pay-
ments."6 It then used this reasoning to bolster Delta Dental's
defense of a valid business justification to SmileCare's anti-
trust allegations and ultimately to dismiss the claims. 65 The
business justification offered by Delta Dental was that the ac-
tuarial basis of its insurance plan requires patients to pay for
cost-sharing amounts out of their own pockets in order to avoid
the "moral hazard" associated with insurance.
160. Courts seldom condemn rules adopted by professional associations as
unreasonable per se or extend the per se analysis to restraints imposed in the
context of business relationships where the economic impact of certain prac-
tices is unknown. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text (discussing
the reluctance of courts to find per se unreasonable rules adopted by profes-
sional associations).
161. See supra notes 83-84 (discussing the applicability of the "rule of rea-
son" approach to allegations of anticompetitive restraints).
162. See supra note 84 (discussing the factors considered in rule of reason
cases).
163. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text (summarizing the stan-
dard for summary dismissal of antitrust claims).
164. See supra notes 97, 99-100 (addressing the validity and merits of co-
payment plans generally and Delta Dentars policy in the context of a copay-
ment waiver).
165. See supra notes 90, 95 and accompanying text.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
As the dissent aptly pointed out, however, to consider this
defense, the court must first decide whether the conduct is anti-
competitive. 66 Here, the SmileCare court accepted the truth of
Delta Dentars asserted defense while rejecting the truth of the
asserted claims. 167 The court did not adequately explain why it
accepted the business justification as a "foregone conclusion."
Whether a defendant asserts a valid business justification re-
quires an extensive factual inquiry, thereby precluding sum-
mary dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). 68
Despite enthusiastic support by the court, Delta Dental's
business justification is suspect. Consider, for example, results
from empirical studies demonstrating that the price elasticity
of demand for dental care is extremely low.169 That the elastic-
ity of demand is low suggests that patients will not, in fact,
seek unnecessary or inordinate amounts of dental care simply
because the services are covered by dental insurance.70 This
empirical evidence directly counters the court's finding that the
Delta Dental policy is economically valid because it moderates
the effect of the moral hazard of insurance by sensitizing pa-
tients to the cost of care. 71 More importantly, given the proce-
dural posture of the SmileCare case, the question of whether or
not a moral hazard is present and operational in the dental in-
surance industry should have been viewed as a question of fact,
thereby precluding dismissal of SmileCare's claim." Indeed,
the court should have allowed SmileCare to present factual
empirical evidence that supported its position.
166. See supra note 107.
167. See supra note 104.
168. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text (summarizing the stan-
dard for summary dismissal of antitrust claims). Even the majority recog-
nizes that the existence of a valid business reason is a question of fact. See
supra text accompanying note 104 (quoting the coures pat declaration that
Delta Dental's business defense is "a foregone conclusion requiring no further
analysis").
169. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
170. See supra note 20.
171. See supra notes 19, 99.
172. See supra note 58. The Supreme Court has held that courts should
examine the economic realities of markets on a case-by-case basis. See East-
man Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 467 (1992). The
issue of moral hazard in the dental insurance industry certainly qualifies as a
characteristic of the relevant product market. Thus, it was inappropriate for
the SmileCare court to conclude that the moral hazard occurs in the dental
insurance industry and then to use the theory to establish Delta Dental's
business justification.
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CONCLUSION
The decision by the court in SmileCare Dental Group v.
Delta Dental Plan of California is unique in that it involves an
antitrust complaint in the supplemental dental insurance
market. The case is also noteworthy because the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit took the unexpected and
controversial step of affirming the lower court's dismissal of
SmileCare's antitrust complaint for failure to state a claim, de-
spite ample evidence that Delta Dental's policy of prohibiting
its providers from accepting supplemental insurance payments
had potentially severe and adverse implications for consumers,
providers, and supplemental insurance plans.
SmileCare's antitrust claims should have survived dis-
missal because the plaintiff alleged predatory conduct with
enough sufficiency according to the generally accepted stan-
dard of review in antitrust cases. For reasons related to public
health, the case should have been allowed to proceed. Cost
sharing for dental services can represent a substantial barrier
to access to care for patients with limited financial means, and
supplemental dental insurance can bridge that gap in cover-
age.
Rather than a "signpost for the future" in antitrust en-
forcement, SmileCare represents an aberration that should not
be repeated. Future courts should apply the current standard
of review to antitrust complaints and resist the temptation to
grant unwarranted deference to health care defendants.
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